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Abstract 
We study the role of social diversity in the evolutionary game and opinion dynamics on scale-free networks. Each individual is 
assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent D  is an adjustable parameter that controls 
the level of diversity among individuals in the network. It is found that there exists an optimal value ofD , leading to the highest 
cooperation level or the fastest consensus. We give some qualitative explanations for the emergence of optimalD .
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1. Introduction  
As well known, the diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout 
the animal world. Due to the existence of social diversity, the impact of different individuals can be different. 
For example, leaders may have stronger influence than others and their actions or opinions may be followed 
more frequently. In this paper, we explore how the social diversity affects the evolutionary game theory and 
the opinion dynamics.   
Cooperation is ubiquitous in a variety of complex systems ranging from natural to economical and social 
systems [1]. However, understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperative behaviors remains a 
challenge. In this regard, evolutionary game theory has provided a suitable mathematical framework to address 
cooperation [2, 3]. A general model for cooperation among social species, including human behaviors ranging 
from family relations to global warming [4] is the public goods game (PGG). In a typical PGG played by N 
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individuals, each individual can choose to cooperate or defect. Cooperators, denoted by C, contribute an 
amount c to the PGG, while defectors (D) do not contribute. The total contribution is multiplied by a factor r, 
and is then redistributed uniformly among all players. 
The study of opinion dynamics has also attracted much attention in the physics community and many models 
have been proposed to describe the processes of opinion formation, such as the voter model [5] and the majority 
model [6]. Given the recent widespread interest in complex networks [7, 8], the effect of the network topology on 
the dynamical progresses described by these models has been extensively studied [9–15]. A common feature of 
many models of opinion formation is the emergence of a global consensus, in which all agents share the same 
opinion. It has been found that the consensus time is not only related to the evolutionary rules of opinion dynamics 
[16, 17], but also to the network structure [18]. 
2. Effects of social diversity on the spatial public goods game 
To incorporate the heterogeneity in the PGG, we introduce diversity in the strategy updating according to the 
degrees of the individuals (nodes) in the network. This is reasonable because, updating rules play an important role 
in the evolution of cooperation, where individuals can update their strategies by adopting different rules in the 
evolutionary game. For example, in Refs. [19], a stochastic evolutionary rule is proposed: whenever updating 
strategy, each individual randomly selects one of its neighbors to refer to, and adopts the strategy of the reference 
with a probability depending on their payoff difference. Due to the existence of social diversity, the selection of a 
neighbor as a reference by an individual is usually not completely random in the decision-making process. Our 
approach is then as follows. We incorporate the heterogeneous network topology in strategy updating by assuming a 
preferential imitation rule so that the evolution of cooperative behavior in the PGG can be addressed in a 
quantitative manner [20]. Specifically, each individual i is assigned a weight Dik , where ik is the degree of 
individual i andD is an adjustable parameter which we call the diversity parameter. During the evolutionary process, 
every individual chooses one of its neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to the neighbors’ weight. 
We find that there indeed exists an optimal value of D that leads to the highest level of cooperation, in agreement 
with physical intuition. 
According to Ref. [21], each individual i participates in interactions in 1ik  neighborhoods that center about i
and its ik  neighbors, where each neighborhood contains a central node and all nodes that are directly connected to it. 
Each cooperator contributes a total cost 1 c  shared equally among all the neighborhoods that it engages. The 
strategy is 1 xs  if a C-game is played and 0 xs  if a D-game is played. The payoff of an individual x with 
strategy xs  associated with the neighborhood centered at an individual y is given by 
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 where 0 i  stands for y, is is the strategy of neighbor i of y, and ik is its 
degree. The total payoff of player x is ,,¦
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itself. In our model, each individual i is assigned a weight Dik . In the process, every individual chooses one of its 
neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to the neighbors’ weight, i.e., the probability yxA o of x
selecting a neighbor y is
¦
 o
j
j
y
yx k
k
A D
D
ˈwhere the sum is over the neighbors of x. For 0!D  (< 0), high-degree 
(low-degree) individuals have larger probability to be selected as references. In the case of 0 D , individuals are 
chosen randomly and uniformly as references for a neighbor. Player x adopts the chosen neighbor y’s strategy ys
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 o  whereN  denotes the amplitude of noise. Following 
the previous studies [22–25], we set · 1.0 N .
  To incorporate diversity in our model, we assume that players are nodes in a Barabasi-Albert scale-free network 
[26]. In the network model, there are m nodes initially. At each time step, a new node with 0m  edges is added and 
preferentially attached to m existing nodes with probability proportional to the degrees of existing nodes. The 
average connectivity of the network is controlled by m and the degree distribution is power-law with the exponent -3. 
Initially, the two strategies, C and D, are randomly distributed among the individuals with equal probability 1/2. An 
indicator of the final degree of cooperation is the cooperator density cU  in the steady state, which is the fraction of 
the population involved in cooperation. 
To characterize the effect of varying D  on cooperation, we plot cU  as a function of the diversity parameter 
D for different values of r, as shown in Fig. 1. The phenomenon of optimal cooperation is unequivocal: for fixed 
value of r, there exists an optimal value of D  for which cU  is maximized. 
Fig. 1. Steady-state cooperator density cU as a function ofD for different values of r. The population is set to be N = 2000 and 
average connectivity is 4 k . Figure comes from Ref. [20].
  Firstly, for 0D , low-degree individuals have a larger probability to be selected to refer to. When r is small, e.g., 
r < 3 (the smallest group size in our present model), even the smallest group does not favor cooperation. In this case, 
learning from low degree individuals who occupy most nodes in the network cannot promote cooperation. Secondly, 
note that, since hubs usually have much higher payoffs, their strategies will dominate their neighbors. As a result, 
for intermediate values of D  (say, near the optimal value), low-degree individuals around the defector hub (D-hub) 
would prefer to select D-hubs as references. As a result, the number of cooperators around a D-hub decreases 
rapidly, reducing quickly payoff for the hub. The payoffs of C-hubs can also decrease, but the decreases are 
typically insignificant. This is so because on a scale-free network, hubs share few neighbors so that most of the C-
hub neighbors tend to follow the C-strategy. As a result, D-hubs become vulnerable to cooperators. Once an original 
D-hub is occupied by a cooperator, its neighbors will subsequently take the strategy of cooperation, prohibiting the 
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diffusion of defection. Thirdly, for large values ofD , a C-hub is more likely to select a D-hub as a reference initially. 
If the payoff of the D-hub exceeds that of the C-hub, it will become a defector, so are its neighbors. This tends to 
promote the diffusion of defectors. Combining all three regimes ofD , we can expect the existence of an optimal 
value of D  that leads to a maximum degree of cooperation. 
Fig. 2. Times series of cooperator density in hubs’ neighborhoods for (a) 1 D  and (b) 6 D . (c) Time series of 
cooperator density cU  for the entire network for 1 D  and 6 D . The network size is 2000 and the average connectivity 
is 4 k . For (a) and (b), open circles and open squares indicate evolutions of cooperators around the highest-degree and 
the second highest-degree node, respectively, where the two hubs are connected and share 5 neighbors. Initially only the 
highest-degree individual is defector and others are cooperators. The multiplication factor is r = 1.2. Figure comes from Ref. 
[20]. 
To provide support for the above scenario, we construct a special scale-free network where the highest-degree 
node has 103 connections and the second highest-degree node has 99 connections, and the two hub nodes are 
connected. Initially, only the highest-degree individual is a defector and all the other individuals are cooperators. We 
then compute the cooperator densities in the neighborhoods of the two hubs as functions of time, as shown in Figs. 
2(a)-(c). From Fig. 2(a), we see that, for 1 D , the cooperative neighbors around the C-hub only decrease by about 
10% under the influence of the D-hub, and the cooperation density in the D-hub’s neighborhood decreases rapidly 
initially and then increases to unity. At the turning point, the D-hub is occupied by a cooperator. For 6 D  [Fig. 
2(b)], the cooperator density in the C-hub’s neighborhoods remains high at the initial time step, but after the second 
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time step, the number of cooperators around the C-hub decreases rapidly, indicating that a defector has taken over 
the C-hub. Figure 2(c) shows the evolution of the cooperator density cU  for the entire network for 1 D
and 6 D , where the initial condition is that there is a single defector at the highest-degree node. One can see that 
for 1 D , cU decreases at the beginning and then increases to a high value. For 6 D , cU decreases to a low 
value. 
3. Effects of social diversity on the opinion dynamics 
FIG. 3. Consensus time cT as a function of D for different average connectivity k . The inset shows the optimal values 
ofD , optD , as a function of k . The network size N = 4000 and the number of initial opinions G = 2. Figure comes from Ref. 
[27]. 
In the voter model (VM) [13], each node of an network can be in one of two discrete states. The VM evolution 
consists in randomly choosing one node (a voter) and the voter adopts the states of a random neighbor. We propose 
a modified VM model [27], in which the selection of one of two individuals’ opinions as their common opinion is 
based on the social diversity and the individual with stronger social influence will more successfully impose its 
opinion to the other individual. 
Let us briefly introduce our opinion dynamics model. Initially, N individuals are embedded in a network. Each 
individual i is assigned a weight Dik , where ik is the degree of individual i andD is an adjustable parameter which 
we call the diversity parameter. Here we can think of the weight as the strength of social influence. Each individual 
holds one of G opinions with equal probability. At each time step, a pair of connected individuals is randomly 
selected to update their opinions. The two individuals will adopt one of their opinions as the common opinion. The 
probability pi of choosing one of them i’s opinion as the common opinion is proportional to i’s weight: 
DD
D
ji
i
i kk
kp

 .
If 0!D , the high-degree individual has stronger influence and its opinion has larger probability to be selected as 
common opinion. If 0D , the opinion of the low-degree individual is more likely to be chosen as the common 
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opinion. In the case of 0 D , the social diversity disappears and two selected neighboring individuals’ opinions 
have the same probability to be selected as the common opinion. 
In the following we investigate the effects of social diversity on the consensus time cT  for reaching the global 
consensus. We assume that individuals are nodes in the well-known Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free network [26]. 
Figures 3 show the consensus time cT  as a function of D  for different average connectivity k . One can see 
that there exists an optimal value ofD , optD , resulting in the shortest consensus time. Moreover, from Fig. 3, one 
can observe that the value of optD is positive, indicating that appropriate high-degree individuals’ influence can best 
favor the achievement of consensus. 
FIG. 4. The number of opinion clusters clN  versus rescaled time t=N for different values of D . The average 
connectivity 6 k , the network size N = 2000 and the number of initial opinions G=N=2000. Figure comes from Ref. [27]. 
Scale-free networks usually have a few high-degree nodes while most nodes are of very low degree. For largeD ,
the high-degree individuals’ opinions have large possibility to be chosen as the common opinions. Hence opinions 
held by individuals of high degree are more easily spread in the network, consequently favors the achievement of 
the final consensus. On the other hand, the opinion dynamics is preceded by formation of some big opinion clusters 
around the high-degree individuals, within each cluster, individuals share a common opinion. Through the 
competition of these opinion clusters, one big cluster invades the others and finally dominates the system with a 
global consensus. However, for very high value ofD , the competition among different opinion clusters becomes 
very furious, which inhibits the merging of clusters and leads to longer consensus time. 
To provide support for the above analysis, we study the evolution of the number of opinion clusters clN  for 
different values ofD . From Fig. 4, one can see that as the time evolves, clN  decreases to 1. For 0 D , clN
decreases much more slowly, compared with 3 D  and 10, indicating that it is hard to form big opinion clusters 
when D  is small. For 10 D , clN  decreases a little faster than that of 3 D  in the initial evolution. However, 
when only a few clusters remain in the system, for example, 10clN , in the case of 10 D , the system takes a 
much longer time to reach the final consensus than that of 3 D . This indicates the competition among small 
numbers of big opinion clusters become furious, and the biggest cluster needs a very long time to invade others and 
dominate the system. 
1864 H.-X. Yang, B.-H. Wang / Physics Procedia 3 (2010) 1859–1865
 Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2010) 000–000  
4. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, we have studied the effects of social diversity on the evolutionary game theory and the opinion 
dynamics. The diversity of individuals is realized by assigning a weight which represents the strength of social 
influence to each individual. A tunable parameter D  is introduced, governing the weight based on the degree of 
individuals. The most interesting result is that there exists an optimal value of the parameter D  that leads to the 
highest cooperation level for spatial public goods game and the fastest consensus for the opinion dynamics. Our 
studies may be useful in understanding the role of individual diversity in human society. 
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